PORA – Vanguard of Democracy

A Case Study of the Civic Campaign PORA

and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine

Vladyslav Kaskiv

(author)

Iryna Chupryna, Anastasiya Bezverkha, Yevgen Zolotariov

(co-authors)

This case study was published on the occasion of the first anniversary of the civic campaign PORA and is dedicated to all activists who made this campaign a success. It presents a first overview of the creation, development and victory of the largest civic campaign that became the central vanguard and player of the recent democratic breakthrough in Ukraine. The study covers the period prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign to the presidential ballot in fall 2004, the course of pre-election and election developments, and the eventual Orange Revolution in Ukraine. It reconstructs the political context that lead to the emergence of the civic campaign PORA, its activities and the influence it exerted over developments in Ukraine. This case study also provides an opportunity to assess the extent, to which NGOs can impact on public and political processes on a national scale, and to which the strategic planning of this campaign generated the practical results PORA set out to achieve.

Kyiv, April 2005 

Chronology of the Civic Campaign PORA

March 9, 2004

The civic campaign PORA and its concept are publicly announced.

April 2004

Campaign activities begin with a first seminar in Uzhgorod (April 14-18). The campaign’s methodology is tested during the mayoral elections in Mukacheve.

April 27, 2004

The official website of PORA is launched (www.pora.org.ua).

May – July, 2004

Practical tests of the campaign continue during interim elections to the Verkhovna Rada in Odesa (May 30) and in Poltavska oblast (June 20), and during mayoral elections in Vakrusheve, Luhanska oblast (July 11).

August 1-8, 2004

A training camp in Evpatoria, Crimea, is organized for more than 300 PORA activists.

August 1 – November 21, 2004

The PORA campaign is launched on a national scale. The first of several stages of the campaign - “Time to stand up” – begins. Over the next months, the stages “Time to think”, “Time to vote”, “Time to win”, “Time to understand – they lie” and “Vote or you’ll lose” follow.

September 12, 2004

Mayoral elections in Zdolbuniv, Rivnenska oblast, provide a further test for the PORA campaign methodology.

September 20 – November 21, 2004

As a preventive campaign against election fraud, polling station commissioners are informed about their criminal liability for the falsification of election results.

October 1-31, 2004

Monitoring of the drawing up of the voter’s lists nationwide

October 15-31, 2004

A wave of repressions by state authorities ensues against PORA, including the fabrication of criminal cases, arrests of PORA activists, searches of the Freedom of Choice Coalition office and in the apartments of activists. PORA responds with a series of activities “We are no terrorists”.

October 20 – November 21, 2004

The “Orange Wave” activity launches a mass distribution of orange ribbons, scarves and clothes.

October 20 – November 21, 2004

Strike committees are created in universities and institutes of higher education in Ukraine aimed at organizing mass protests of students in the case of electoral fraud.

October 31, 2004

The first round of the presidential elections takes place and is observed by PORA activists.

November 3, 2004

The mobile informational stands for involvement of the students in the movement are set up in Kyiv.

November 6 – November 21, 2004

Protests are launched against manipulations during the first round of the presidential elections. The first tent camp is established on Kontraktova ploschcha near the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”. PORA announces the ultimatum to the executive authorities and to the President Kuchma.

November 1 – November 21, 2004

The informational campaign “Everyone for the protection of elections” and “Vote, or you’ll lose” is carried out.

November 21, 2004

The second round of the presidential elections takes place and is observed by PORA activists.  The PORA participants march from Kontraktova ploschcha to Khreshchatyk.

November 22, 2004

A tent camp is set up on Khreshchatyk in central Kyiv. This camp is to become the epicenter of popular protest.

November 23, 2004

The press center of PORA is opened at the tent camp on Khreshchatyk.

November 24, 2004

The third tent camp of PORA is set up at Bankova street, near the Presidential Administration.

November 25, 2004 – January 23, 2005

Protests are systematically broadened to include blockades of buildings of the state administration, and tent camps near the Verkhovna Rada, the residence of outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, and other state authorities.

November 27, 2004

PORA conducts the action “An hour with Donetsk people”, sharing the medicines and food with the miners from Donetsk oblast brought to Kyiv.

November 28, 2004

PORA activists picket the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyiv, protesting against the intervention of Russia into the internal affairs of Ukraine. The fourth tent camp of PORA is founded near the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

December 3, 2004

PORA openly addresses Viktor Yushchenko and expresses its concern about possible negative consequences of the compromise between the Syla Narodu Coalition and its political opponents.

December 16, 2004

PORA activists leave the tent camp on Khreshchatyk, because the further functioning of the tent camp is unnecessary. PORA starts to work actively on ensuring the free and fair repeat voting on December 26, 2004.

December 19, 2004

Organizational forum of the civic campaign PORA aimed at summarizing the preliminary results of the campaign’s activities is held at the premises of the Union of Writers of Ukraine in Kyiv.

December 14 – December 24, 2004

A motorcade “Train of Friendship” travels across eastern and southern regions of Ukraine to advocate the unity and democratic development of Ukraine.

December 26, 2004

The third round of the presidential elections takes place and is observed by PORA activists.

January 29, 2005

An official ceremony is held to mark the completion of the civic campaign PORA.

Basic Information about Ukraine

Ukraine is the second-largest European country (603,700 km²) with a population of nearly 50 million inhabitants. Ukraine as it exists today is one of the successor states to the Soviet Union. It attained its independence through the Declaration of State Sovereignty adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine on August 24, 1991. In the course of long Ukrainian history, the country has frequently been the playground for international events and geopolitical processes. Similarly, its location at the eastern border of Europe places Ukraine at the intersection of many different cultures and civilizations.

At the beginning of the 20^th century, the territory of present-day Ukraine was mainly divided between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. The latter contributed to the emergence of substantial European traditions in Ukrainian society that endured throughout the Soviet period. Within the USSR, Ukraine was the third-largest and second-most populous republic, with a highly developed industrial sector and advanced scientific structures in applied mathematics, artificial intelligence, nuclear research, exploration of space and the Antarctic, geology and physics.

Main branches of the Ukrainian economy were plane and rocket construction, shipbuilding, engineering and machinery, electronics, and metallurgy. Ukraine occupied a prominent position in the social and cultural sphere, education, medicine and arts. Ukrainian athletes won 150 Olympic gold medals. A significant portion of the officers and generals of Soviet armed forces was represented by Ukrainians, whose republic also housed the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal that was abandoned by Ukraine in 1994.

In 1991, Ukraine initiated the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequently established itself as an independent state. Unique among post-Soviet countries, Ukraine avoided interethnic conflicts and civil war. Instead, Ukraine has contributed to peacekeeping missions in more than 10 countries on three continents, among them Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, and the Congo.

In recent years, Ukraine has shown considerable economic growth rates that are amongst the highest in Europe. The country possesses a developed network of oil and gas pipelines, depositories and refineries, and of an advanced electrical power grid. Ukraine is also a part of an important Eurasian transport corridor.

In 2002, Ukraine officially declared its will to Euro-Atlantic integration, and its aspiration to join the EU and NATO. Given its geopolitical location and human resources potential, Ukraine represents an important element of Euro-Atlantic security.  This significance of Ukraine is underlined by the complex problems faced in the region and unpredictable evolution in neighboring Russia, Belarus and Moldova.

The Political Context prior to the 2004 Presidential Elections

By 2004, Ukraine was characterized by increasingly authoritarian tendencies, with fundamental freedoms and rights of its citizens at risk or openly violated. Society had lost trust in the ex-communist nomenklatura that had been in power since Ukrainian independence in 1991.

In early 2000, a team of reformers came to power and started a policy of curbing the “shadow” economy. During this reform period, Ukraine declared its aspirations for European integration. This new approach triggered optimism in the society and stimulated business and social activities. However, the success of reformers came to threaten the interests of financial-political and criminal clans, and a year after it had come to power; the reform-oriented government was dismissed. This led to the rise of the democratic opposition led by ex-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. The social and political influence of this opposition increased steadily, and by the beginning of 2002, it had become the most influential political force, which subsequently won the 2002 parliamentary elections. However, President Kuchma was able to suppress the parliamentary opposition and to create a pro-presidential majority held together by fear, blackmail and bribery. The rift between these power blocs increasingly became one that was founded on principal social priorities and geo-political orientation, that is, for or against liberal democracy, market economy and Euro-Atlantic integration. This choice was to be made during the 2004 presidential elections.

However, weak political party structures, the absence of effective local self-government and a strong vertical structure of executive power created unprecedented conditions for manipulating the course and results of these elections. Tight control over information and virtual absence of independent mass media were characteristic for Ukraine. In these circumstances, diverse ideological and political groups, with the exception of the Communist Party of Ukraine, mobilized around single leaders.

At the same time, Ukrainian civil society underwent an active transformation. In their struggle for democracy during previous election campaigns, NGOs had acquired considerable experience in providing information, educating citizens and monitoring the electoral process. Influential NGO coalitions and large-scale cooperation programs had emerged. Illustrative of this development are the largest NGO Coalition “Freedom of Choice” that was founded in 1999, the Coalition “New Choice 2004”, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, and other civil formations. In addition, a powerful youth movement had emerged during the struggle for independence in the early 1990s and grown mature over the following years. In early 2004, these prior developments had laid the ground for a complex program of cooperation among NGOs. This program, aimed at ensuring free and fair presidential elections in 2004, was labeled “Wave of Freedom” and included a series of informational, educational and monitoring projects. The most important component of this program was the activity of the civic campaign PORA that was to deliver information to citizens and to protect the fairness of electoral process and results.

The Program “Wave of Freedom” and its Main Elements

The program “Wave of Freedom” outlined the main objectives, approaches and principles that were to guide a complex and nation-wide informational and educational campaign aimed at protecting the results of the elections. The implementation of this plan became part of a democratization strategy coordinated by different groups. Its ambition was to ensure a critical influence by civil society on the political development of Ukraine and to cement the country’s democratic and Euro-Atlantic choice.

The national program “Wave of Freedom” included a variety of analytical, educational and monitoring projects, and an ongoing and large-scale delivery of objective information to Ukrainian voters through a vast volunteer network. “Wave of Freedom” comprised of the following projects:

­        Public monitoring of campaign finances in the run-up to the presidential elections;

­        Public monitoring of the drafting of voter lists prior to the elections; 

­        “Hotline” information resources covering the elections (www.hotline.net.ua);

­        Training for commissioners of polling stations;

­        International public monitoring of voting at polling stations abroad;

­        A large-scale informational and educational campaign (PORA).

Given the complexity of this program and the variety of partner coalitions and organizations, it was critically important that monitoring, informational and educational projects were systematically planned and interacted with one another. Only in such a combination, civil society could hope to be successful and to exert a significant influence over the electoral process. Through this interaction, legitimacy and efficiency of civic activities, and public trust in civil society could be expected to increase considerably. For example, results of monitoring or analytical activities of NGOs frequently fed into the information and education materials distributed by PORA, and recording of violations of the electoral process became central for the activities of volunteer networks.

The Main Idea of the PORA Campaign

The civic campaign PORA acted independently from political structures, commercial entities or the state administration as a self-governing all-Ukrainian action aimed at ensuring democratic elections. Central to its program was a complex, nation-wide information and mobilization campaign. Under conditions of far-reaching censorship and absence of independent media, the main idea behind PORA was the creation of alternative “mass media”, in which volunteers deliver election-related information “from hand to hand” directly to people throughout Ukraine. The campaign was to continue until the official recognition of the legitimacy of the elections by all subjects of the electoral process and by international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe etc.). The general plan of campaign activities foresaw two stages.

The first, obligatory stage included varied information and education activities aimed at increasing voter turnout, counteracting censorship and supplying voters with objective information about the electoral campaign, programs of individual candidates, voter rights and the necessity of their protection in the case of violations. The second, critical stage envisaged the organization of mass protests aimed at protecting the results of the elections.

PORA acted on the basis of a methodology and organizational model created by its own experts. This, as well as the scale reached and the techniques employed by PORA made this campaign truly unique. This became possible through:

­        an analysis of prior practices and experiences of similar movements in Central and Eastern Europe (Slovakia , Serbia, etc);

­        the involvement of experts and new technologies in planning and management;

­        the active use of modern communication systems in the campaign’s management;

­        the availability of examples of successful experiences with public activities;

­        the absence of political and financial dominance by local and international donors;

­        a high degree of efficiency, especially if compared to political structures and electoral teams.

Nonetheless, the key factor behind PORA’s success was the sincere motivation of its participants. PORA united people for the sake of victory of freedom and democracy. In order to keep this energy until the democratic triumph was achieved, PORA organizers followed one important rule: future forms and structures of PORA activities were not to be discussed before the successful completion of the electoral campaign.

On this basis, PORA defined its aim and main tasks. The aim of the campaign was to provide, during the 2004 presidential elections, the conditions for the democratic development of Ukraine, the realization of complex reforms, the formation of transparent power structures, and the country’s Euro-Atlantic choice. In this pursuit, the main tasks of the campaign were

­        to provide alternative mechanisms for delivering objective information about the course of the electoral campaign and the positions of individual contenders for the presidency directly to citizens in all regions of Ukraine;

­        to increase voter turnout among those electoral groups that are in support of democratic development, national priorities, and Euro-Atlantic integration;

­        to form a powerful network of volunteers to disseminate the campaign’s ideas and to distribute information on a large and systematic scale;

­        to attract politically neutral or insufficiently informed citizens to join the democratic forces;

­        to mobilize society in protection of their democratic rights and freedoms, should these be at risk through the falsification of election results or other illegitimate actions by authorities.

PORA activities followed the basic principles of openness, non-partisanship, responsibility, volunteering, and the priority of public interests over corporate ones.

Given acute problems with public access to information and “freedom of speech” in Ukraine, the civic campaign PORA was based on the fundamental idea of delivering information about the presidential elections directly to citizens. This delivery occurred in the form of direct communication with voters, distribution of printed products and visual information, and holding of education events. Primary tools for informing the public included:

-          Print products (leaflets, brochures, stickers, small souvenirs etc.);

-          Public activities and demonstrations;

-          Visual presentations (posters, graffiti etc.);

-          Media presentations (clips, interviews etc.);

-          Periodicals.

To a large extent, information materials used within the framework of the campaign were designed by the coordination center of the campaign or by partner NGOs.

This information strategy involved several elements. The first of these focused on internal mobilization and involved the recruitment of volunteers that became the primary basis of the campaign. The second stage turned to informing the public through large-scale distribution of information about the presidential elections, the candidates and voter rights. Central to the third stage was mobilization of voters to take part in the elections. Fourthly, activities were planned to prevent possible manipulations of the electoral process and its results.

Once election fraud became obvious, the campaign was enriched by the additional and crucial component of protecting free and fair results of the elections (attachment 14).

Who Created PORA?

The creation and activities of PORA go back in philosophy and traditions to the democratic students’ movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which played a crucial role in Ukraine’s gaining of its independence. Unfortunately, the political achievements of this movement were largely lost by political attacks by the former communist nomenklatura that remained influential. Yet as Ukraine’s democratic deficit (corruption and the Melnychenko tapes, freedom of mass media and the death of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze) became increasingly apparent, this movement reemerged in the framework of the Ukrainian public resistance committee “Za pravdu” (“For the Truth”). Its participants and leaders contributed significantly to the emergence and organization of PORA, and for many of them, the activities of the civic campaign PORA became the high point of their long struggle for an independent and democratic Ukraine.

The organizational and human resource base of PORA consisted of two main segments:

­        members of the five largest all-Ukrainian youth organizations: Christian-Democratic Youth of Ukraine, Union of Ukrainian Youth, Zarevo, Young Prosvita, Association of Law Students; local NGOs and student organizations in the universities and institutes of higher education; 

­        member organizations of the Freedom of Choice Coalition of Ukrainian NGOs. 

Relationships between these organizations, and the principles guiding their partnership and cooperation in the realization of campaign were spelled out in the declaration about the organization of the nation-wide PORA campaign (see attachment 2).

Regional organizations and members of the Freedom of Choice Coalition of Ukrainian NGOs lent invaluable organizational and technical support to the campaign. Their capacity partly resulted from the long-term financial support by international donors geared at developing a network of civil society centers in Ukraine. This made it possible for the campaign to draw on considerable material and technical resources of regional NGOs. Over 150 different regional and national NGOs provided such assistance to PORA, managed financial resources and legal support on the regional level, and lent office space and equipment, communication technology, and storage facilities for information and education products. In fact, products that were intended for a particular segment of the population in the regions were developed and produced by regional partners.

The Main Stages of PORA Activities

Development of campaign methodology (January – March 2004)           This initial stage occupied the early months of 2004, and it included a detailed formulation and description of goals and objectives of the campaign, structure, organizational management, informational strategy, and technology. The methodology was derived from two sources. On the one hand, it was based on Ukrainian experiences with non-violent students’ movements in the late 80s, and with the “Ukraine without Kuchma” actions of the “Za Pravdu!” (“For the Truth!”) civic committee. On the other hand, international experience was utilized, especially that of the Slovak campaign OK ‘98 and the movements Otpor in Serbia and Kmara in Georgia. Nonetheless, PORA was uniquely designed for the Ukrainian context, taking into account the specifics of Ukraine’s social and political situation; its size and population; administrative, cultural and geographical particularities; international and regional factors; resources and partnerships. This first stage concluded with the official presentation of the campaign concept and methodology at www.hotline.net.ua – “Everything about Elections”.

Organizational arrangements (March 2004)

The next stage consisted of establishing coordination between the different civic movements participating in the campaign, creating organizational structures and launching training events. The council and coordination center of the campaign were established, style and image of the campaign were designed, the regional structure and the network of mobile volunteer groups were developed. The web site of the campaign was established at www.pora.org.ua, which served not only as a source of information but also as a practical tool for the coordination among regional departments. This website became, and remains, one of the five most popular political internet sites in Ukraine. A system of immediate dissemination of information by SMS was put in place and proved to be important. The constituent assembly of the PORA campaign was held with the participation of 70 regional leaders on April 14-18, 2004 in Uzhhorod in Western Ukraine.

Testing of campaign methodology (April – August 2004)

A series of by-elections to the parliament and of mayors in several regions of Ukraine provided opportunities to test the campaign methodology. The first and most significant demonstration of PORA activities was during the mayoral elections in the Transcarpathian town of Mukacheve. For the incumbent authorities, the election was to serve as rehearsal for manipulating the upcoming presidential elections, while democratic movements viewed them as a test for preventing future election fraud. The Mukacheve elections became the first victory of PORA as it succeeded the force the illegally proclaimed mayor to step down. No less useful was PORA’s oversight of elections in the agrarian Poltavska oblast in central Ukraine, the big southern city of Odesa, and the industrial town of Vakhrushevo in eastern Ukraine. During these elections, communication between mobile group leaders, monitoring of voter lists, access to information, observation of electoral commissions, control of the use of administrative resource, monitoring of the vote and organization of mass protests were tested. A key element during this phase was the testing of different formats of information and education activities, such as “hand to hand” and “door to door”.

Elaboration of the informational strategy of PORA (April – August 2004)

The formative stage saw the development of a complex information strategy that was based on prior experiences, the results of analysis and sociological research, the outcomes of monitoring conducted by Ukrainian NGOS. This strategy, elaborated by an informational-analytical group that functioned within the structure of the PORA coordination center, continued for the full length of the campaign. This strategy was comprised of five main phases aimed at individual issues deemed crucial for legitimate and democratic elections:

1.       Dissemination of objective information about the electoral campaign and the programs of  the individual candidates;

2.       Mobilization of voters for participation in the electoral process;

3.       Explanation of voter rights;

4.       Preventive information about their criminal liability for the breach of electoral laws of state authorities and commissioners at polling stations commissioners;

5.       Public appeal for protecting election results (if necessary).

During this stage of preparation, more detailed thematic blocks and the main messages were developed for each phase, contents and design of information products were developed, and a plan of information events was created (see plan of information strategy and list of main messages in the appendix). 

The English version of the PORA website helped to establish connections with the international community and mass media. The website not only provided foreigners with latest news of PORA but it also generated international support, such as the “Letter of freedom and solidarity” that was signed by more than 560 people from 29 countries (see attachment 10). In addition, a special newsletter about Ukrainian civil society in the 2004 presidential elections, under the title “Times of Change” was regularly mailed to hundreds of recipients in the United States and Europe (an archive of newsletters can be found at www.pora.org.ua).

Training of activists (August 2004)        Training of campaign participants was the last stage before launching the active phase of the PORA campaign. This stage addressed three main elements:

-          Development of a set of instructions and methodological materials for the field work conducted by regional coordinators and activists (“How to bring truth to the people”, “Rights during arrest”, “violations of the electoral law”, “Internal communication and coordination of actions”, and others);

-          A training event “PORA pochynaty!” (“Time to begin!”) for more than 300 regional leaders held near the Crimean town of Yevpatoria from August 1-8, 2004;

-          Organization of a consultation seminar for 72 regional NGOs that provided organizational, material, technical and logistical support to volunteer groups on September 18, 2004 in Kyiv.

Developing the volunteer network

and conducting the campaign (Sept.-Nov. 2004)

With the end of summer vacations, the PORA campaign entered its active phase. The campaigns regional network was developed intensively, and logistics and communications were put in place to ensure an efficient distribution of several series of thematic of informational and educational materials. September 2004 was marked by the final formation of a stable network of the campaign’s 72 regional centers (kushes), and field structures of around 150 mobile groups throughout Ukraine. In the following months, mobilization of volunteers continued and resulted in PORA’s attracting of more than 30 000 registered participants of the campaign. However, the general number of the persons that took part in different PORA activities is estimated to exceed this figure. The growing scope of PORA activities, and the repressions activists faced, led to a noticeable improvement of the composition of PORA activists. Virtually in all regions of Ukraine, representatives of the local intellectual elite, the state administration and the business community joined PORA. This increased the resources of the PORA campaign significantly.

Owing to the efforts of PORA activists, the autumn months provided Ukrainians with unbiased information about the course of the electoral campaign and mobilized society to protect the results of the election should there were any attempts at manipulation. The campaign against biased mass media became one of the most important PORA activities. It included the distribution of stickers with the logos of well-known Ukrainian mass media accompanied by the statement “They lie”, as well as a series of activities near TV stations (“It’s better to chew than speak”, “Kill the TV within yourself”, and others).

Within the framework of six information series of the campaign (“Time to stand up”, “Time to think”, “Time to vote”, “Time to win”, “Time to understand – they lie” and “Vote or you’ll lose”) 37 different types of printed products (newspapers, stickers, leaflets, brochures, posters, etc.) with the general circulation of around 40 million copies were published and distributed on the national level. In addition, numerous specific and regional products were published. None the less, the monitoring of voter lists carried out by PORA activists across Ukraine and on the basis of a unified methodology became an important instrument of the campaign.

Repressions against PORA (October 2004)   

The scale of PORA activities and the elusive character of its mobile groups led the state authorities launch an unprecedented wave of repressions against the leaders and activists of PORA. This assault culminated in the fabrication of a criminal case accusing PORA of organizing terrorist acts. On October 15, 2004, a search of PORA offices in Kyiv by law enforcement agencies and state militia found explosives in the premises of PORA; these were in fact planted to incriminate the organization. On this basis of the planted explosives, a criminal case was opened against PORA activists for “the organization illegal military units” and the “organization of terrorist acts”. This was followed by searches of the offices of the Freedom of Choice Coalition, of private apartments of the campaign’s leaders, and the detention and interrogation of more than 150 activists of PORA throughout Ukraine. Fifteen criminal cases, with accusations ranging from the forging money to rape to the illegal possession of weapons and explosives, were fabricated against PORA activists in different regions of Ukraine. More than 300 persons involved in the activities of PORA were detained before the first round of the presidential elections. This vigorous, large-scaled and well-prepared attack was reinforced through a media campaign in almost all state-controlled mass media that aimed at misinforming citizens about the aims and methods of the PORA activities.

For this reason, the campaign’s leaders decided to stimulate the student component of the campaign. This made it possible to represent the campaign as a democratic student movement that could not be associated with terrorism by the broad public. Similarly important for the success of PORA in this information struggle with the authorities were maximum publicity and transparency of the campaign and its work. Taken together, these elements led to a rapid growth of the popularity, scale and influence of the campaign. Well before the presidential elections, PORA became the key democratic player that was ready to actively protect free and fair election.   

Protecting the Election:

the Orange Revolution (November – December 2004)

The repressions against PORA deprived Ukrainian society of any remaining illusions that the upcoming presidential elections would be free and fair. Therefore, beginning in mid-October, PORA started to actively prepare for the organization of mass protests. With this in mind, the campaign’s organizational structure was adjusted and the campaign’s objectives were revised. After October 21, 2004, PORA transformed from an informational and educational campaign into an organizer for the active protection of the election results, with a central focus on “direct action” such as staging mass protests. The campaign’s coordination center transformed itself into an operational headquarters (attachment 7) to coordinate a series of mass street activities. This operational headquarters was located in the offices of the Freedom of Choice Coalition of Ukrainian NGOs which had, on October 20, 2004, publicly announced its support of PORA. The center of gravity of PORA activities shifted to the capital, yet active participation of the campaign’s regional representatives continued. The PORA operational headquarters made the important decision to create a system of strike committees in universities and institutes of higher education in Ukraine that later played a crucial role in the Orange Revolution.  

Thus, PORA approached the first round of the presidential elections on October 31, 2004 with a full understanding of the situation and with a detailed plan of organizing protest activities in the case of electoral fraud. Unfortunately, these expectations were justified. Just a day after the first round, it became clear that the elections had been stolen from the Ukrainian people. Subsequently, PORA were the first to issue a statement about the falsification of the first round of elections (attachment 6) and called upon the citizens of Ukraine to assert their democratic rights. On November 6, 2004 the first tent camps of protest appeared, first on Kontraktova Ploshcha in Kyiv (around 30 tents and more than 200 people), and later on in the cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Cherkassy, Dnipropetrovsk and Ternopil, these camps became the centers of protest and involvement of new activists. Over the next two weeks, PORA’s efforts to establish student strike committees covered 21 of 25 Ukrainian oblasts and more than 70 educational establishments, but first and foremost the country’s capital city.

PORA started preparation for large-scale protests after the first round, in which the main contenders to the presidency had been Viktor Yanukovych, the representative of the incumbent authoritarian regime, and the leader of the democratic political forces, Viktor Yushchenko. After that first round, PORA faced an acute need to coordinate its actions with the electoral headquarters of Viktor Yushchenko. Hence, on November 15, 2004, the PORA council decided to coordinate its activities with Yushchenko’s headquarters and to jointly work towards the protection of free and fair election results. The operational headquarters managed by Roman Bezsmertniy and his deputies Taras Stetskiv, Volodymyr Fylenko and Yuriy Lutsenko was responsible for the organization and coordination of mass protests. On November 17 they elaborated an action plan, whose implementation was partly the responsibility of PORA. In particular, the plan foresaw that PORA would provide for the setting up and functioning of tent camps that became the basis for all future activities (attachments 8a,b).

The second round of elections on November 21, 2004 was accompanied by an even larger scale of electoral fraud that included forged ballots, illegal voting, falsifications of voter lists, vote-buying and intimidation of voters, and violations of the law by members of the polling station commissions. These violations were recorded by tens of thousands of observers from political parties and both candidates, PORA and other civic initiatives, as well as numerous international observers. Based on the results of election monitoring, the elections qualified as fraudulent without reservations. Later on, this assessment was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Ukraine, which issued a resolution that the second round of the presidential elections would have to be repeated.

The subsequent period between November 21 and December 3 became one of the most critical periods in Ukrainian history. Following the second round of the elections and the manipulations accompanying it, Ukrainian society needed to stand up to protect its democratic rights. In this situation, the informational and educational activities of PORA assumed a very important role. On November 22, the day following the vote, the morning silence in Kyiv’s central square was broken by first slogans shouted by students: “Svobodu ne spynyty” (Freedom can’t be stopped) and “Nas bagato – nas ne podolaty” (We are many – we can’t be overcome). Student strike committees gathered under the leadership of Andriy Yusov, soon followed by tens of thousands of demonstrators at Maidan Nezalezhnosti that was to become the symbol of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and non-violent resistance. Despite the hopes of the authoritarian regime that temperatures of –10 degrees and sleet would stop the demonstrators, PORA activists erected the first of 1,500 tents eventually covering Kyiv’s central boulevard Khreshchatyk. The main heroes of this tent camp were activists who came with the experience of the student revolution 1990 – Andriy Husak, Andriy Rozhniatovsky, Ihor Kotsiuruba, and young Mikhaylo Plotnikov. Their task was to organize the life of more than 15,000 people living in the tent camp. Their work, as well as that of many other PORA activists, followed the action plan previously elaborated by the campaign’s coordination center under the leadership of Yevhen Zolotariov. These protest activities were key events of the Orange Revolution and all of this required coordination. Order and safety were necessary in the Khreshchatyk tent camp (Taras Pastushenko, Yevhen Radchenko); the blockades of administrative buildings and in particular the presidential administration (Andriy Bondarenko); the establishment of a special tent camp near the Ukrainian parliament (Vasyl Boychuk and Ruslan Kotsaba), the creation of a media center (Olena Hantsiak-Kaskiv). The tireless civic engagement of these leaders and of thousands of PORA activists gave birth to a new chapter in Ukrainian history, and they set an example to the hundreds of thousands of people participating in the Orange Revolution.

These civic activities contributed to the historical decision by the Supreme Court of Ukraine that ordered a repeat of the second round of the 2004 presidential elections that eventually led to the victory of the democratic candidate Viktor Yushchenko in free and fair elections. Before this democratic triumph, however, PORA faced another challenge that threatened the Orange Revolution. The problem that had arisen consisted in a regional split of Ukrainian society that had been triggered by the incumbent regime. The Western and central regions that largely backed Viktor Yushchenko and the Eastern and Southern parts where support for Viktor Yanukovych, where pitted against one another and was causing a great deal of strife. Due to this friction PORA decided to organize a “Motorcade of Friendship” (attachment 11). Between December 14 and 24, a convoy of more than 50 cars set out to visit 15 regions of Ukraine (including Kyiv, Cherkassy, Kirovograd, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Symferopol, Yalta, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and  Poltava) where there was a threat of instability. Under orange, Ukrainian and PORA banners, the convoy covered 3,700 km with its reconciliatory, informational and educational mission. This became the last project of the civic campaign PORA, and it highlighted again the yearning for freedom and democracy PORA and the Orange Revolution stood for.

Completion of the activities of civic campaign PORA

The official inauguration of the newly and democratically elected President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, on January 23, 2005, marked not only a victory of democracy in the country but also the completion of activities of the civic campaign PORA. Its success was celebrated in an official ceremony on January 29 in Kyiv that was attended by hundreds of activists, representatives of the diplomatic community (including the ambassadors of Canada, Japan, the Czech and Slovak republics), members of the Ukrainian parliament (Yuriy Pavlenko, Davyd Zhvaniya, Borys Tarasyuk, Petro Poroshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko), members of the Central Election Committee (Ruslan Kniazevych, Andriy Magera), representatives of the NGOs and think tanks (Ihor Kohut, Kost Bondarenko, Igor Zhdanov, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Sergiy Taran, Ihor Popov, Serhiy Rudyk, Denys Bohush), and a host of well-known public figures and journalists. In acknowledgement of its contribution to democracy in Ukraine, PORA received an official letter from the newly elected President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko (attachment 12).

The Organizational Structure of PORA

The organizational structure of the civic campaign PORA followed a model of horizontal network management. It was based on mobile groups to provide for information and education activities in specific region. These Riys comprised of between 10 and 15 volunteers. Altogether 380 to 400 Riys formed an organized network that functioned throughout the electoral campaign and whose activities reached an estimated 25 million citizens. Riys acted in circumscribed territories – Kusches – whose population they addressed. 78 Kusches covered the entire territory of Ukraine, with each comprising a population of approximately 500,000 people and reflecting specific regional, social and cultural profiles (map of kushes – attachment 3). The activity of this vast network were organized by the coordination center of the campaign (structure of the coordination center – attachment 5), which was responsible for elaborating the information strategy of the campaign, coordinated the actions of regional units, organized the production and distribution of printed products, and consulted with partners. The campaign council brought together influential public figures, representatives of the business community, politics, state and international structures. The council was in charge of major strategic decisions and helped to build political support for the campaign.

It is important to emphasize the high level of organizational and financial autonomy of PORA’s regional departments. This helped to ensure continuation of the overall campaign even in the case that some of its components, including the coordination center, were prevented from functioning. Hence, managerial, organizational, technical and informational needs of the campaign resulted in the following structure:

-          Riy/Royoviy (Riy leader)

-          Kusch/Kuschoviy (Kusch leader)

-          Coordination center

-          Council

-          Official partners

When it became obvious that the presidential elections had been fraudulent, the civic campaign PORA was reformed for the purpose of the second, mobilization stage of the campaign. The headquarters of PORA coordinated the movement and placement of volunteers in Kyiv (Andriy Husak), organized the setting up and maintenance of the tent camps (Yevhen Zolotariov) and strike committees (Andriy Yusov), and carried out information activities, preparation, printing and distribution of campaign materials.

Partners and Resources

Partner movements in Ukraine         

Prior and during elections, a range of movements and organizations worked towards democratic, free and fair elections in Ukraine.  More than 10 organizations were active on a larger scale. Of these, “Studentska Khyvilya” (Student Wave), “Chysta Ukraina” (Clean Ukraine), “Black PORA!” and “Znayu” (I know) were the most important ones.

“Student Wave” was an official project of the “Our Ukraine” election headquarters to strengthen youth involvement in support of democratic changes and in the election campaign of Viktor Yushchenko. Student Wave organized a large youth activity “Student Assembly” in support of Viktor Yushchenko, which took place in Kontraktova Square in Kyiv on October 16. Student Wave also disseminated stickers and other printed materials. During the elections, this movement participated in election monitoring and other activities.

“Clean Ukraine” was an influential independent initiative that became known for the activism, mobility and discipline of its members. The most significant activities of Clean Ukraine included the distribution of several series of interesting and creative printed materials, the creation of a web site (www.chysto.com), and participation in the monitoring of the elections. Clean Ukraine leaders and members frequently cooperated with PORA and participated in joint actions. Yurko Yuzich, Chysta Ukraina’s representative, was main coordinator of the PORA training camp. Clean Ukraine provided the second largest group of volunteers to take part in rallies and democratic protest.

“Black PORA!” was an independent civic initiative created by a group of activists in the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv and later led by Mykhaylo Svystovich, a prominent participant of the student movement during the 1990s. Black PORA was a genuine grassroots movement without a managing center and organizational structures. Black PORA! distributed stickers “What is kuchmism?” and conducted theater-like happenings “Striped voyage”. Black PORA! acted primarily as the anti-campaign for discrediting the Kuchma regime, and it took part in monitoring the elections.

“I know!” was a civic initiative, which in several regions of Ukraine became visible through stickers and posters.  “I know!” also organized the show  “Chaynykoviy bespredel” in Kyiv on September 25, 2004.

Cooperation with political forces

The civic campaign PORA was an independent and non-partisan initiative. Nonetheless, the successful pursuit of its activities required frequent communication with representatives of diverse political forces. Already during the mayoral elections in Mukacheve, PORA cooperated with the leading candidates to ensure free and fair elections. During the presidential elections, PORA permanently informed the candidates’ campaign headquarters about its activities and updated them about the results of its election monitoring. However, PORA did not engage in the election campaign of individual candidate, nor did its activities suggest a partisan choice.  Starting in September 2004, PORA addressed the headquarters of all candidates with a proposal to exchange information on a regular basis. The headquarters of candidates Dushin, Yushchenko, Moroz and Chernovetsky responded to this proposal and subsequently, cooperation continued until the first round of the presidential elections.

After the results of the first round were announced, PORA declared its opinion that the elections had been fraudulent. At that time, it became clear that the incumbent regime was determined to seize power by way of manipulating the elections in favor of its candidate Viktor Yanukovych. In response, PORA launched direct activities aimed at protecting free and fair elections, and starting from October 15, 2004, these activities were coordinated with the coalition of democratic forces “Syla narodu” (Force of the people), which included Viktor Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine”, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko. A plan of action, partly implemented by PORA, was elaborated. Hence, close cooperation between PORA and democratic political forces began only after the first round of the elections, and it was based on partnership without integration of organizational structures and resources.

Other partners

Given the non-governmental and non-partisan status of the PORA campaign, among its partners were a broad range of Ukrainian NGOs, international organizations and democratic movements in other countries, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. Although PORA received only modest resources from international and foreign partners, their experience, solidarity and political support did much to strengthen PORA and its role for the democratic process in Ukraine. 

The administrative structure and human resources of PORA largely derived from the qualified staff and organizational resources of existing non-governmental organizations, in particular those belonging to the Freedom of Choice Coalition. Leading youth and student organizations became important partners of PORA, as did various policy think tanks, including the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, the Institute of Mass Communication, the International Center for Policy Studies, the Laboratory for Legislative Initiatives, and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation.

Cooperation with the small group of independent media helped to highlight PORA activities. The information service “Hotline” (www.hotline.net.ua), the Internet-based newspaper “Ukrainska pravda”  (www.pravda.com.ua), the TV Channel 5, Radio “Era”, and the newspapers “Ukraina Moloda” and “Vechyrny Visty” played an important role in publicizing the campaign.

At several critical moments, the activities of PORA were supported by representatives of Ukrainian intellectual and cultural life (Viktor Neborak, Vasyl Shkliar,Yury Andrukhovich, Lina Kostenko, Yurko Pokalchuk, Serhiy Zhadan, Dmytro Stus), well-known human rights defenders (Yevhen Sverstiuk, Mykola Gorbal, Vasyl Ovsienko, Yevhen Zakharov) and organizations (Ukrainian Helsinki group, Amnesty International).

On an international scale Pavol Demes, a well-know civic activist from Slovakia and one of the leaders of the OK ‘98 campaign in that country made important contribution to PORA. In preparing the campaign, PORA activists benefited from the experiences of their colleagues from Solidarity in Poland, OK ’98 in Slovakia, OTPOR in Serbia, and Kmara in Georgia. Partner movements of PORA included Belarus’ ZUBR (Vlad Kobets), which signed a declaration of partnership with PORA already on March 9, 2004, as well as other democratic organizations from Belarus. Representatives of these movements, along with many young activists from other countries, participated personally in the events of the Orange Revolution.

Campaign’s funding and resource supply

In order to achieve resource stability and efficiency, PORA’s coordination center developed a decentralized system of financial and resource management. With the help of the campaign’s main partners, a broad network of experienced regional NGOs, a scheme was developed that diversified the financial sources and resource supply of individual activities and projects. This scheme helped to decrease the risk of resource concentration.

The campaign’s initial funding was supplied by PORA founders. These funds were directed to organizing activities, information support and printing of materials. Training of activists was supported by small grants provided by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Freedom House and the Canadian International Development Agency (in the overall amount of approx. 130 000 USD). It is worth noting, thus, that PORA, unlike its counterparts in Serbia and Georgia, received only minimal financial support from the international community.  

In this situation, entrepreneurs from all regions of Ukraine provided the bulk of resources for PORA activities during the presidential elections. A large number of these entrepreneurs had been directly involved in the students’ movement of the early 1990s. The support they provided came largely in kind, including free production of publications, communications, transportation etc. It is estimated that the value of this in-kind support exceeded 5 million Euro. In cash, PORA expended 1.2 million Euro (including the resources used at the regional level) It is also noteworthy that more than 60 per cent of these resources were spent during the Orange Revolution and for the organizational needs of tent camps, transport, food etc. At PORA’s coordination center, a special monitoring unit oversaw the usage of resources by individual parts of the campaign.

What Made PORA a Special Campaign?

The civic campaign PORA was unprecedented not only in Ukraine and the Commonwealth of Independent States but also in Central and Eastern Europe more broadly. It introduced a hitherto unknown scale, scope, influence and range of techniques of civic action. PORA functioned as a united initiative of hundreds of NGOs; it involved large numbers of volunteers; and it implemented dozens of different projects. PORA included elements of monitoring, information, and education, as well as eventually public protest. In doing so, PORA functioned within the larger framework of the “Wave of Freedom”, that is, activities by civic organizations that aimed at the protection of free and fair elections and its results. A further characteristic of PORA was that, despite being informed by the experiences of international partners, it was driven and supported mainly by domestic Ukrainian actors and partners across different sectors of society.

PORA acted in a social and political environment that was particularly complicated and demanded the development of specific techniques and formats of information, education and protest activities. The context, in which PORA emerged and acted, was characterized by:

­        the large territory (603,700 square kilometers) and population (47 million) of Ukraine;

­        an equal density of population throughout the territory of Ukraine (with the exception of the highly populated Donbas);

­        a comparably small share of the population residing in the capital city of Kyiv (4 percent);

­        the special geopolitical and strategic location of Ukraine;

­        a low level of international support for the democratic process and reforms in Ukraine;

­        historical, social, and cultural diversity across the regions of Ukraine;

­        natural conditions and seasons;

­        domestic peculiarities of the development of democratic rights and freedoms;

­        considerable interference of Russia with the electoral process in Ukraine;

­        a specific constellation of the semi-authoritarian regime reigning in Ukraine;

­        the infrastructure and level of development of NGOs, their networks and coalitions;

­        the structures, level of development and organizational capacity of party-political structures, especially on part of the democratic opposition.

In these circumstances, PORA developed a range of very specific techniques. To a limited extent, these benefited from the experience of successful democratic movements elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Georgia, Serbia and Slovakia. Equally important were prior Ukrainian experiences during the country’s fight for independence since 1985. At the same time, PORA’s coordination center had to account for an effective use of existing human resources, organizational capacities, and technical possibilities. This resulted in a civic campaign that included the following main components. 

Information and educational efforts

n public intercity and suburban transport

PORA actively used the potential for communication with people and distribution of information in public intercity and suburban transport. Ukrainians frequent public transport terminals at an average of 35 times per year  (excluding municipal transport). PORA decided to take advantage of this frequency and to tailor its information and educational program accordingly.

Informational and educational work in small cities and rural areas

Ukraine is, to a great extent, an agrarian country. Its population contains a large segment of 35 percent that lives in rural areas. This rural population is particularly susceptible to manipulation.

Activities in cities

PORA efforts in larger cities were marked by mass actions, pickets and demonstrations, as well as distributing of information in frequented public areas.

Continuous and encompassing monitoring

PORA aimed at monitoring the political and electoral process in full, that is, prior to the elections and after the vote. It included national monitoring of voter lists, campaign finances, as well as the voting process. For this purpose, PORA developed a network structure, in which large numbers of volunteers ensured a continuous presence in all necessary institutions and across all parts of Ukraine.

Cultural events and concerts 

In order to attract young people PORA organized dozens concerts throughout the pre-election period and in various parts of Ukraine (Lviv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava etc.). Once mass protests had begun, PORA organized a rock-marathon “Time for Freedom” that took place near the tent city on Kontraktova Ploshcha in Kyiv and that lasted several days. These concerts, as well as other forms of mass events, created occasions to publicize positions and mottos of PORA, mobilize new volunteers, and strengthen public support for PORA.

Information channels, press-service,

website and cooperation with mass media     

The dissemination of unbiased information was one of the core elements of PORA activities. Contents and channels of information required to be clear coordinated. The official PORA website (www.pora.org.ua) became both one of the main channels for informing the public and an important means for PORA activists to exchange information, sample documents, and coordinate activities.

Active usage and popularization of the style 

A key element in the campaign was the use of a single style that is associated with PORA by Ukrainians at large. PORA succeeded in establishing a style through banners, t-shirts, badges and print products, and its style has become one of the most recognizable ones in the country. More broadly, the Orange Revolution united the country under a single color that came to stand for freedom.

Graffiti           

The use of graffiti has become an important tool to reach young people and to involve them actively. Graffiti has significantly popularized the PORA style and made it recognizable on a broad scale.

In developing these techniques, PORA managed to respond successfully to the specificities of Ukraine, as is also illustrated by the following indicators. In the course of its activities in 2005, PORA

­        distributed 40 million copies of print products;

­        involved in its work 35,000 permanent participants and an even larger number of supporters;

­        conducted more than 750 regional pickets and public actions;

­        organized 17 mass rallies with more than 3,000 participants;

­        set up the tent camp in Kyiv’s main street, Khreschatyk, with 1,546 tents and more than 15,000 residents;

­        organized 12 other tent camps;

­        created a web site (www.pora.org.ua) that rated fifth among all websites in Ukraine;

­        carried out a national monitoring of all voter lists.  

In sum, PORA enabled civil society to exert an outstanding influence on the social and political process in Ukraine. It united representatives of a new professional generation from all regions of Ukraine around a common vision of the future of their country. It helped to create the conditions for Ukraine to become a new political nation on the basis of clearly defined principles, ideas and approaches to the further social, political and economical development of Ukraine.

After the Triumph: What’s Next, PORA?

During the one year of its existence, the civic campaign PORA became a pillar of Ukraine’s new democracy – a community of people from different walks of life, generations, professions, social and geographical background, and even of diverging political views, which were united in their faith in the free, just and democratic future of their country. These people believed in themselves and in their ability to influence society.

PORA became a genuine prototype of civil society that now gives birth to diverse civic organizations and political initiatives. Bearing in mind the experiences of similar democratic movements in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, PORA decided not to transform itself into a single institution, be it political party, non-governmental organization or think tank. PORA believes that it formed democratic leaders who can contribute to Ukraine’s development on a number of levels:

­        international center for the support of transitional democracies;

­        several All-Ukrainian non-governmental organizations;

­        political party;

­        other institutions that can be initiated by the PORA activists.

The activities of the above-mentioned institution mentioned corresponds to the logic of previous PORA activities and aimed at developing a strong, stable and democratic Ukraine:

The international center for support of transitional democracies is to become an authoritative non-governmental institution to supports democratic processes in Central and Eastern Europe. The center will bring together knowledge and experiences of democratic movements in the region, civic activists as well as experts. The center is to institutionalize and promote the Orange Revolution as a model case for the region. The center aims to build Ukraine’s regional leadership in the field of democracy assistance. Priority countries of the center are to be Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova, among others. The establishment of this center responds to numerous requests for partnership PORA has received from democratic movements in the countries mentioned above. The government of Ukraine and several international organizations support the idea of establishing this center.

A range of  non-governmental organizations aim to further the accomplishments of the civic campaign PORA and to become effective watchdogs of democracy in Ukraine. Activities of these organizations continue PORA activities, albeit adjusted to the democratic format that Ukraine has now adopted. Obvious priorities of these NGOs will include the fight against corruption, information, education and monitoring of elections, and promotion of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

The civi? party PORA will be a new political force. The party will draw talented young professionals into the realm of politics and administration. These experts do not see for themselves viable conditions for acting within existing political parties and structures. These individuals have already built careers for themselves in state institutions, international organizations or the business community. The civic party PORA is to be an independent political structure based on a clear prioritization of national interests over corporate ones. Not least, the party aims to provide the new Ukrainian president with broader-based support.

Currently, thus, PORA actively continues to involve the young leaders from civil society, the business community and the public sector, and from different regions of Ukraine. They share a common view of the priorities and strategies for Ukraine’s future development. PORA leaders can now be found in almost all political structures, state bodies and local self-governments. This outreach, and the moral authority the movement earned in its fight for freedom and democracy, puts PORA in a position to play a unique public role in Ukrainian society.

Main Obstacles and Challenges

PORA’s success should not obscure the fact that problems and obstacles accompanied its emergence, development and activities. The most important of these were the following.

Pseudo-competition is one of the most typical problems for civic movements. Civic leaders waste much time and effort in opposition to one another, often accompanied by dishonesty and tricks. Civic initiatives, in order to be successful, need to avoid such relationships and make their activities public and comprehensible for society.

The quasi-publicness of many post-Soviet NGOs results from the fact that they were inspired by genuine civic initiatives but emerged as instrument to obtain grants from international organizations and donors. Nonetheless, civil society needs to cooperate with these organizations to benefit from their infrastructure, material and technical resources to be successful in election-related work.

Coordination and communication among NGOs, their leaders and representatives of diverse movements, initiatives and groups is complicated and at times problematic. It is necessary to develop common procedures of communication, to which partners commit. This also makes cooperation more responsible, transparent and understandable.

Public relations and information strategies of civic campaigns have to take into account that independent mass media are typically absent in authoritarian settings. It is necessary achieve any, and even negative, reactions from the official mass media, and to respond immediately to any accusations brought forward. This will help to raise awareness of the movement among the broader public.

Absence of sufficient funding is another typical problem. Yet a good purpose will always be able to raise necessary funds. While different from country to country, fundraising generally requires a well-developed plan, a justifiable budget and a comprehensible presentation. 

Attacks by law-enforcement structures and criminal networks are not rare in authoritarian contexts. In order to minimize the impact of such attacks, decentralized structures, resources and management are important.

Lessons of the campaign

1.       There are no unrealistic tasks; yet there are people who still have not learned to perform them.

2.       Do not pay attention to pseudo-competition and quarrels; it’s your PORA!

3.       Public structures can exert a strong influence on the social and political process only when they have a common goal, and coordinated planning and activities.

4.       A civic campaign can be effective only if it a) analyzes the main risks; b) develops techniques managing those risks; c) prepares a comprehensive plan of activities; d) builds a coalition of competence; e) integrates information, education and monitoring components, as well as protest actions if needed; f) avails itself of a legitimate and efficient coordination center

5.       All campaign participants have to fulfill the tasks and responsibilities they committed to, and the coordination center must be strict in controlling individual participants;

6.       Non-violent resistance is the efficient instrument for democratic changes, and it helps to win the support of society.

7.       Civic leaders launching non-partisan campaigns must have a profound understanding of political processes and of the civic sector, and they need to have a strategic vision of the development of both.

8.       It is necessary to develop an intensive cooperation with the media, lawyers, political actors, donors, local communities, trade unions and the international community.

9.       There is a critical need for using new communication and information technologies, such as the Internet, SMS, and others. Without these tools, PORA would have never succeeded!

10.   No universal models and techniques exist for civic campaigns. Each country is unique, and international experience can only be the point of departure for creative interpretation, adjustment and action.

11.   Hitherto employed mechanisms, methods or slogans should not be discarded easily.

12.   Support often comes from quarters and sides one expects least.

13.   Success is closest when times seem to be toughest. Within hours, the first few demonstrators were joined by thousands of Kyiv residents; within days, millions of Ukrainians arrived from all parts of the country. 

Contact 

PORA can be contacted at:      1/3 Desyatynna str., Kyiv, Ukraine 01025,

Phone: +38 044 461 90 22

E-mail: This email address is being protected from spam bots, you need Javascript enabled to view it

www.pora.org.ua

Appendices (Available from PORA upon request)

1.       Manifesto of the civic campaign PORA

2.       Declaration about support of the nation-wide informational and educational campaign PORA 

3.       Map of the activities of mobile groups

4.       Regional structure of the nation-wide PORA campaign

5.       Structure of the Coordination Center of PORA campaign

6.       Statement of the civic campaign PORA on the issue of the preliminary results of the elections of President of Ukraine 2004

7.       Structure of the operative headquarters of PORA

8.       a) Plan of preparation and holding of the mass action on November 21-22, 2004

b) Scenario of the mass action on November 21-22, 2004

9.       Order by the head of civic commandant’s office

10.   Letter of freedom and solidarity

11.   Information about the car tour “Train of Friendship”

12.   Letter by the President of Ukraine to the closing assembly of the civic campaign PORA

13.   Celebrities about PORA

14.   Plan of information strategy’s realization

The text of the case study and the attachments can be found at the PORA official web-site  www.pora.org.ua

About the Authors

Vladyslav KASKIV was a member of the PORA council, head of PORA coordination center, and author and coordinator of the PORA strategy. In April 2005, he was appointed official advisor to the president of Ukraine. At the same time, he has headed a working group on the transformation of the PORA campaign into a range of civil society institutions.  Vlad was member of the presidium of the public resistance committee “For the Truth!” In 1999-2004, he was coordinator of the largest Ukrainian NGO coalition “Freedom of Choice”, which implemented various monitoring projects during the 1999 and 2004 presidential elections.

?nastasiya BEZVERKHA was head of PORA’s public relations department and speaker of the campaign. In fall 2004, she was involved in the coordination of the press service. Between August and October 2004, she worked in Bratislava, Slovakia, from where she edited and distributed a news bulletin to inform the international community about PORA’s activities. She was a recipient of the honorary diploma of PORA.

Iryna CHUPRYNA was a member of the PORA coordination center. She was involved in monitoring projects, coordinated PORA’s external contacts, and organized the work of the PORA coordination center.